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COMMENT
MANNING, POWELL, AND THE HABITUAL
MISUNDERSTANDING OF ADDICTION
MATT DEAN†
INTRODUCTION
Bryan Manning, a homeless resident of Roanoke, Virginia,
has been arrested and prosecuted more than thirty times for
drinking or possessing alcohol.1 Although alcohol is generally legal in Virginia,2 Mr. Manning was forbidden for many years to
“possess” it, “consume” it, or “purchase” it.3 On at least one occasion, police arrested him merely for “smelling like alcohol.”4 On
another occasion, he was arrested because he happened to be
shopping in a Walmart where alcoholic beverages were sold.5 For
decades, Virginia law permitted a state circuit court to issue a
civil order declaring an individual to be “an habitual drunkard”
and “prohibiting,” or interdicting, “the sale of alcoholic beverages” to that individual “until further ordered.”6 At a civil hear†
Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2021, St. John’s University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Sheldon A. Evans for his guidance
in writing this Comment, to the editorial board and staff of the Law Review for their
hard work and friendship, and to my family and my chosen family for their love and
support. Also, a special thanks to my husband and biggest cheerleader, Brian J.
Keller, who encourages me in everything I do.
1
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 51, 54, Hendrick v.
Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868 (W.D. Va. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Manning v. Caldwell,
900 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 16-CV0095) [hereinafter Complaint].
2
Nine Virginia counties forbid the sale of “liquor by the drink” and are thus classified as “dry,” but sales of beer and wine are permitted everywhere. VA. ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE CONTROL AUTH., A COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2018, at 41 n.1 (2018), https://www.abc.virginia.gov/
library/about/pdfs/2018-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KYV-JMH5]. Even within
“dry” counties, “certain towns” and “election districts” may choose by referendum to
permit the sale of liquor by the drink. Id.
3
See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 50.
4
Id. ¶ 52.
5
Id.
6
See Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 866, § 1, 1993 Va. Acts 1257, 1293 (current
version at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333); Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d
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ing on October 5, 2010, the Circuit Court for the City of Roanoke
entered just such an interdiction order against Mr. Manning.7
“[N]either Mr. Manning nor counsel on [his] behalf” attended
that proceeding.8
An individual subject to an interdiction order could face as
much as a year in jail merely for possessing or attempting to
possess alcohol, or for public intoxication.9 The statute neither
defined the term “habitual drunkard” nor provided guidance for
courts in determining how or when to apply it.10 In Manning v.
Caldwell (Manning II), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, invalidated Virginia’s interdiction scheme on two grounds.11 First, the court held that the
statutory scheme was unconstitutionally vague because it failed
to establish “any standard of conduct by which persons [could]
determine whether they [we]re violating the statute.”12 Second,
relying in part on the United States Supreme Court’s plurality
opinion in Powell v. Texas,13 the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Virginia’s interdiction scheme violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment because it penalized homeless alcoholics “for conduct that [was] both compelled
by their illness and [was] otherwise lawful for all those of legal
drinking age.”14 According to the dissent, however, the majority’s
opinion introduces a “nebulous ‘nonvolitional conduct’ defense,”
which promises to “metastasize and absolve individuals from

264, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In 2020, the Virginia General Assembly amended
the interdiction statute to preclude the interdiction of “habitual drunkard[s].” Act of
Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 150, § 1, 2020 Va. Acts (Va. Advance Legis. Serv. Mar. 2020)
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333).
Only one other state, Utah, implements an interdiction scheme similar to
Virginia’s. See Brief of National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Manning II, 930 F.3d 264 (No. 171320).
7
See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 49.
8
Id.
9
See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-322 (2016) (providing that an interdicted individual
who “possess[es] any alcoholic beverages” or is “drunk in public” is “guilty of a Class
1 misdemeanor”); id. § 18.2-11 (2014) (providing that the “authorized punishment[ ]
for conviction of a [Class 1] misdemeanor” is “confinement in jail for not more than
twelve months”); Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269.
10
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 268.
11
Id. at 285–86.
12
Id. at 274.
13
392 U.S. 514 (1968).
14
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 281 (emphasis omitted).
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personal responsibility for all forms and manners of criminal
acts.”15
Legal scholar Glanville Williams once wrote that “cases in
which the moral indignation of the judge is aroused frequently
make bad law,”16 and Manning II may be just such a case. A majority of the en banc court concluded that the burden of interdiction was too great for Mr. Manning and other homeless alcoholics
to bear. But in lifting that burden, the en banc court erred in
relying on the Supreme Court’s fragmented decision in Powell.
Within weeks of the decision in Manning II, litigants in the
Fourth Circuit and elsewhere began to cite it either as precedent
or as a candidate for reversal.17 For example, the plaintiffs in a
case before the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland cited Manning II to support an argument that the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s Public Charge Rule “is subject
to void-for-vagueness review.”18 And the correct interpretation of
Powell recently became an issue in City of Boise v. Martin.19
Noting that the various interpretations of Powell among the
Courts of Appeals have created a “three-way split,” the petitioner
in Martin asked the Supreme Court to review “the fractured
opinion in Powell,” which has “left unsettled an important question of . . . law.”20 Whether and to what extent Powell remains
good law has been an open question for some time.21 The Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Manning II has only served to renew the
urgency of that question.

15

Id. at 304 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 105
(1957).
17
Moreover, as is to be expected, Courts in the Fourth Circuit have begun
treating Manning II as binding precedent. See, e.g., Hill v. Coggins, 423 F. Supp. 3d
209, 218 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (“[L]aws that nominally impose only civil consequences
warrant a ‘relatively strict test’ for vagueness if the law is ‘quasi-criminal’ and has a
stigmatizing effect.” (quoting Manning II, 930 F.3d at 273)).
18
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum
at 28–30, CASA de Maryland v. Trump, No. 19-CV-2715, (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2019).
19
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, City of Boise v. Martin, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019)
(No. 19-247).
20
Id. The Court denied the petition for certiorari and let stand the three-way
circuit split. See Martin, 140 S. Ct. 674 (mem.).
21
See Maria Slater, Note, Is Powell Still Valid? The Supreme Court’s Changing
Stance on Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 104 VA. L. REV. 547, 564–72 (2018).
16
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I. BACKGROUND
A.

Virginia’s Interdiction Scheme

As originally enacted in 1873, Virginia’s interdiction statute
“had a rehabilitative purpose.”22 If at least two of a person’s “relatives or friends” believed him to be “an habitual drunkard and
lost to self-control,” they could swear a “complaint on oath in
writing,” initiating a process by which the alleged “drunkard”
could be committed “to the care and protection” of the Virginia
Inebriates’ Home.23 The statute limited the term of confinement
to twelve months.24 It also provided that anyone who felt “aggrieved” by being deemed “an habitual drunkard” could demand
a jury trial “as a matter of right.”25 If the jury found that the accused was not in fact “an habitual drunkard and lost to selfcontrol,” the court was required to “dismiss[ ] the whole proceeding[ ]” and enter “a judgment against the parties making
complaint, for costs.”26
In 1934, Virginia enacted the interdiction scheme that remained in force until Manning II invalidated it in 2019.27 Section
4.1-333(A) of the Code of Virginia allowed a state circuit court to
“enter an order of interdiction prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages” to “any person” who “ha[d] been convicted of driving . . .
while intoxicated or ha[d] shown himself to be an habitual
drunkard.”28 Although the statute required “a hearing upon due
notice,”29 it neither defined “habitual drunkard” nor provided
“any elements or standards” to guide a court in determining that
an individual “qualifie[d] as an ‘habitual drunkard.’ ”30 Nor did
the statute set forth any procedure by which an interdicted
individual could challenge or rescind the “habitual drunkard”
label. The circuit court had authority to “alter, amend or cancel”
its interdiction orders “as it deem[ed] proper,”31 but if it declined
22

Manning II, 930 F.3d at 270 n.3 (citing Va. Code ch. 83, § 5 (1873)).
Ch. 83, § 5.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 270 n.3.
28
Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 866, § 1, 1993 Va. Acts 1257, 1293 (current version at
VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A)).
29
Id.
30
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 268 (“Instead, [the statute] relegate[d] those matters
‘to the satisfaction of the circuit court.’ ”).
31
Ch. 866, § 1, 1993 Va. Acts at 1293 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1333(B)).
23
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to do so, interdiction otherwise remained in effect “until further
ordered.”32 In other words, unless or until a court acting on its
own initiative deemed it proper to lift an interdiction order,
“habitual drunkard” became “a lifelong label.”33
The interdiction scheme, as amended in 2020, no longer
applies to “habitual drunkards.”34 However, the statute in its
current form still permits the interdiction of any individual who
“has been convicted of driving . . . while intoxicated.”35 The 2020
amendments provided nothing new in the way of process; an
order of interdiction still stands until the issuing court lifts it.36
The “portion of the [interdiction] scheme addressing driving
while intoxicated” was not at issue in Manning II.37
Once interdicted, an individual “is subject to incarceration
for the mere possession of or attempt to possess alcohol, or for
being drunk in public.”38 Specifically, section 4.1-305 of the Code
of Virginia makes it a Class 1 misdemeanor for an interdicted
individual to “consume, purchase or possess, or attempt to consume, purchase or possess, any alcoholic beverage.”39 Section 4.1322 additionally “establishes a Class 1 misdemeanor for an
interdicted person to ‘possess any alcoholic beverages,’ or to be
‘drunk in public.’ ”40 In Virginia, the maximum penalty for a
Class 1 misdemeanor is “confinement in jail” for one year, a $500
to $2,500 fine, or both.41 For an individual who has not been
interdicted, public intoxication is a Class 4 misdemeanor, which
is subject to a maximum fine of $250.42

32

Id. (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A)).
Slater, supra note 21, at 584.
34
See sources cited supra note 6.
35
VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A) (2016 & Supp. 2020).
36
Id. (“[T]he court may enter an order of interdiction prohibiting the sale of
alcoholic beverages to [the interdicted individual] until further ordered.” (emphasis
added)).
37
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269 n.1, 284 & n.21.
38
Id. at 269.
39
VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-305(A), (C) (2016).
40
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-322).
41
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11(a) (2014) (providing a maximum fine); VA. CODE
ANN. § 4.1-305(C) (providing “a mandatory minimum fine”).
42
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (providing that “any person” who appears “in
public” under the influence of “alcohol” or any “other intoxicant or drug of whatever
nature” is “guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor”); id. § 18.2-11(d) (providing that the
“authorized punishment[ ] for conviction of a [Class 4] misdemeanor” is “a fine of not
more than $250”); see also Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269.
33
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Between 2007 and 2018, “[s]lightly more than 1,700 people
were interdicted . . . in Virginia.”43 During that period, two-thirds
of all interdiction proceedings—1,151 in all—occurred in Virginia
Beach, a city that accounted for six percent of the state’s population.44 Additionally, although only a little more than one percent
of Virginians live in Roanoke,45 that city pursued 160 interdictions—more than nine percent of the total.46 By contrast, some
cities interdicted very few individuals. Between 2010 and 2015,
for example, Petersburg and Richmond interdicted only one and
nine persons, respectively.47 Some cities and counties reported
zero interdictions.48
About a quarter of those who were interdicted as “habitual
drunkards” were absent from their own interdiction hearings.49
In such cases, the “ ‘habitual drunkard’ label” became “indelible”
and subjected “people on the interdicted list” to years, or even decades, of suspicion, arrest, and incarceration.50 Bryan Manning’s
interactions with the criminal justice system were not atypical.
Interdicted individuals were arrested while shopping at a 7-Eleven
where alcohol was sold,51 after “ ‘sleeping in a park bathroom’
where ‘a beer can was found in the trash,’ ” and even “for being
‘near’ beer cans.”52

43
Jane Harper, Virginia Law Allows People To Legally Be Declared a Drunk. TwoThirds of Them Are in Virginia Beach, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Apr. 4, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.pilotonline.com/news/crime/article_2f5f511e-3613-11e9-85df-db99c9ec636a
.html [https://perma.cc/7AVW-4DEN].
44
Id.
45
Population Statistics of Roanoke City, Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/roanokecityvirginia,VA/PST045218 [https://perma
.cc/5Q2Q-3KD7] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
46
Harper, supra note 43.
47
Interdiction Fact Sheet, LEGAL AID JUST. CTR. 2, https://www.justice4all.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/LAJC_Interdiction_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW5JZF9L] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
48
Harper, supra note 43.
49
Id.
50
M.L. Nestel, Virginia Jails People for Even Smelling Like Alcohol, THE DAILY
BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://thedailybeast.com/virginia-jails-people-foreven-smelling-like-alcohol [https://perma.cc/VMR5-WPLL].
51
Id.
52
Manning v. Caldwell (Manning I), 900 F.3d 139, 157 (4th Cir. 2018) (Motz, J.,
concurring), rev’d en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019).
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B. Procedural History
1.

The Plaintiffs’ Complaint

In March 2016, Bryan Manning and four other homeless
alcoholics filed a putative class action in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the
Commonwealth’s Attorneys for Roanoke and Richmond.53 The
plaintiffs in Hendrick v. Caldwell sought declarative and injunctive relief “on their own behalf and on behalf of all individuals
who ha[d] been, or [we]re at risk of being, ‘interdicted’ while
being homeless and suffering from alcohol use disorder.”54 The
plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that application of Virginia’s interdiction scheme constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and
Virginia;55 that interdiction was “a quasi-criminal proceeding”
routinely conducted without “adequate due process protections”
guaranteed under the state and federal constitutions;56 and that
the statutory scheme was unconstitutionally vague.57
The five named plaintiffs were interdicted between August
2009 and January 2016.58 In each case, the court specified that
its interdiction order would remain in effect until the court
“alter[ed], amend[ed], or cancel[ed]” it.59 One plaintiff, Cary
Hendrick, was present at his interdiction hearing.60 Hendrick
“requested court-appointed counsel,” but the “court denied his
request.”61 The four remaining plaintiffs were interdicted in absentia and without the assistance of counsel.62
Interdiction subjected at least four of the five plaintiffs to
frequent, repeated arrest. At the time of the complaint, for example, Richard Deckerhoff had been arrested “at least eleven
53

See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
Id.
55
Id. ¶¶ 118, 127, 135; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
56
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 141, 150; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”); VA. CONST. art I, § 11.
57
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 155–58, 163.
58
Id. ¶¶ 40, 49, 63, 75, 89.
59
Id. ¶¶ 41, 50, 64, 76, 90.
60
Id. ¶ 40.
61
Id.
62
Id. ¶¶ 49, 63, 75, 89.
54
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times.”63 In one of those arrests, police officers “determined [that]
a beer can on the ground near Mr. Deckerhoff was in his constructive possession.”64
The Complaint asserted, as a statement of fact, that the five
plaintiffs “suffer[ed] from alcohol use disorder, commonly referred
to as alcoholism.”65 Alcohol dependence is typically characterized
by, among other things, an inability to control the “onset, termination or level of use” of alcohol, “physiological withdrawal”
symptoms “when alcohol use is reduced or ceased,” and persistent use “despite clear signs of harmful consequences.”66 All five
plaintiffs likely suffered from alcohol dependence syndrome.
Three of the five plaintiffs received at least “limited” treatment
for their addiction, but all struggled to maintain sobriety.67 At
least two of the plaintiffs, Cary Hendrick and Ryan Williams,
suffered from severe physical withdrawal symptoms: Hendrick
had seizures when denied access to alcohol,68 and Williams suffered from “shaking, dry-heaves, and increased blood pressure.”69
All of the plaintiffs faced “harmful consequences” as a result of
their drinking—including interdiction, repeated arrest, and incarceration—but all nevertheless persisted in drinking alcohol.70
2.

The Proceedings in District Court (Hendrick)

In April 2016, the defendants, the Commonwealth’s Attorneys
for Roanoke and Richmond, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’
complaint.71 In addition to various procedural challenges, the defendants argued that the “plaintiffs ha[d] failed to state a claim
upon which relief [could] be granted.”72 The district court con-

63

Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 78.
65
Id. ¶ 23.
66
THOMAS BABOR ET AL., ALCOHOL: NO ORDINARY COMMODITY 19 & box 2.2
(2nd ed. 2010).
67
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 46, 59, 72, 97.
68
Id. ¶ 47.
69
Id. ¶ 73.
70
Id. ¶¶ 124–26.
71
See Motion to Dismiss at 1, Hendrick v. Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868 (W.D. Va.
2017), aff’d sub nom. Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en banc,
930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 16-CV-0095); Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868 (No. 16-CV-0095).
72
Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 877.
64
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sidered, and subsequently dismissed, each of the constitutional
claims of the four plaintiffs.73
First, the district court considered whether the interdiction
statute “violate[d] the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment.”74 The plaintiffs relied on the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in Driver v. Hinnant75 that “the State cannot
stamp an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his
drunken public display is involuntary as the result of disease.”76
Additionally, the plaintiffs cited two Ninth Circuit cases,
Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch77 and Jones v. City of Los Angeles,78 for
the proposition that a statute cannot “criminalize[ ] the status of
being an alcoholic.”79 The district court rejected Ledezma-Cosino
as “inapposite,” in part because the Ninth Circuit had “expressly”
declined to consider “when or how persons with chronic alcoholism may be punished for criminal acts committed while in an
alcoholic state.”80 The district court also rejected the holding in
Jones and instead dismissed the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment
claim81 based on a line of cases extending from Robinson v.
California82 through Powell v. Texas83 to Fisher v. Coleman.84
In Robinson, the Supreme Court struck down a California
law that criminalized the “ ‘status’ of narcotic addiction.”85 After
police officers “had occasion to examine the appellant’s arms” and
“observed discolorations and scabs” that appeared to be needle
tracks, the appellant was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted
under a state statute that made it a misdemeanor for a person to
“be addicted to the use of narcotics.”86 The Supreme Court recognized the “broad power of a State to regulate the narcotic drugs
73
See id. at 883, 891–92, 895. In August 2016, the parties moved jointly to
dismiss the state-law claims, and the court did so. See id. at 876 n.2. The court,
having received a Suggestion of Death with respect to named plaintiff Cary
Hendrick, did not consider any of his claims. See id. at 875 n.1.
74
Id. at 884.
75
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
76
Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 884 (quoting Driver, 356 F.2d at 765).
77
819 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.), vacated, 839 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2016).
78
444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
79
Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
80
Id. at 885 (quoting Ledezma-Cosino, 819 F.3d at 1078 n.1).
81
Id. at 885–86.
82
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
83
392 U.S. 514 (1968).
84
486 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981),
overruled by Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II) 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019).
85
Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 885 (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666).
86
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661–62.
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traffic within its borders,” but nevertheless concluded that
“narcotic addiction is an illness . . . which may be contracted
innocently or involuntarily.”87 The Court further held that
a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there,
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Even one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the “crime” of having a
common cold.88

Six years later, in Powell, a plurality of the Court held that
“Robinson did not reach the question of whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishment of conduct symptomatic of a
disease” and that “the doctrines of criminal responsibility are
traditionally the province of the states.”89 Guided by these “important principles,”90 the District Court for the Western District
of Virginia concluded in Fisher that the Eighth Amendment does
not forbid a state from criminalizing “conduct symptomatic of
alcoholism.”91 In fact, the Fisher court found that Powell “specifically rejected” that proposition.92
In Hendrick, the district court held that the interdiction
statute, like the statute at issue in Powell, “impose[d] ‘a criminal
sanction for public behavior which may create substantial health
and safety hazards . . . and which offends the moral and esthetic
sensibilities of a large segment of the community.’ ”93 Even as it
acknowledged that criminal law has evolved over time and continues to evolve in response to “changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man,”94 the court
deferred to the legislature’s prerogative to shape “the outer
contours of what can be punished.”95
Ultimately, the district court held in Hendrick that, because
Virginia’s interdiction scheme targets the possession and consumption of alcohol, it punishes specific acts rather than a
87

Id. at 664, 667.
Id. at 667.
89
Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 885.
90
Id. at 885.
91
Id. at 886 (quoting Fisher v. Coleman, 486 F. Supp. 311, 316 (W.D. Va. 1979),
aff’d, 639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981), overruled by Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II)
930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)).
92
Id. at 886 (quoting Fisher, 486 F. Supp. at 316).
93
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968)).
94
Id. at 887 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 535–36).
95
Id. at 887–88.
88
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status.96 And because Fisher constrained the court from considering whether the “disease” of alcohol addiction compelled the
plaintiffs to commit the prohibited acts, the court was bound to
conclude that the interdiction scheme did not offend the Eighth
Amendment.97
Second, the district court quickly disposed of the plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claim. Because the plaintiffs
had identified themselves in their pleadings as “homeless alcoholics,” and had admitted that they were “compelled to possess
and consume alcohol,” the court “readily” concluded that “the
statutory term ‘habitual drunkard’ ” applied to them.98 And because an individual “may not successfully challenge [a statute]
for vagueness” if it is “clearly” applicable to that individual’s
conduct, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the interdiction scheme on that ground.99 The court
did not, in any case, find that the statute lacked clarity. Relying
in part on Fisher, the court held that the meaning of “habitual
drunkard” is commonly understood and therefore “sufficiently
precise.”100 The court also concluded that the interdiction scheme
provided “explicit standards which law enforcement may apply to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”101
Finally, with respect to the plaintiffs’ due process claim, the
district court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to appointed counsel at their interdiction proceedings, which are civil
matters.102 And because government-appointed counsel represented the plaintiffs at their criminal proceedings, the court held
that the plaintiffs could not state a valid claim under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.103

96

Id. at 888.
See id. at 886–88.
98
Id. at 892.
99
Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)).
100
Id. (citing Fisher v. Coleman, 468 F. Supp. 311, 315 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff’d,
639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981), overruled by Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II) 930
F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he common meaning of the term[ ] habitual drunkard
clearly encompasses one who . . . is admittedly in the continual habit of being
intoxicated from alcohol.”)).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 889–90.
103
Id. at 891.
97
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The Appeal to the Fourth Circuit (Manning I)

The four surviving plaintiffs104 appealed, and a panel of the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.105 Writing
for the panel, Judge Wilkinson devoted just a few paragraphs to
the plaintiffs’ claim that, “despite their nominally civil character,
interdiction proceedings must afford criminal protections” under
the Due Process Clause.106 Finding that interdiction deprives an
individual of nothing more than “the legal right to purchase,
possess, or consume alcohol,” the panel determined that an individual’s liberty is not at stake in an interdiction proceeding.107
The panel further held that, under Paul v. Davis, a potential
“reputational injur[y]” like the one at stake in an interdiction
proceeding is not a constitutionally protected interest, and for
that reason the plaintiffs could not prevail in their due process
claims.108
The panel’s opinion devoted significantly more space to determining whether the interdiction scheme punished a status in
violation of Robinson and the Eighth Amendment. Noting that a
fragmented Court decided Powell in a 4–1–4 decision, the panel
concluded that Powell’s plurality opinion could not be read as
overturning the status-act distinction in Robinson.109 With no
“clear signal from the Supreme Court that Robinson no longer
remains good law,” the panel declined “to overturn or greatly
extend” it to criminalize nonvolitional conduct compelled by
addiction.110 Having concluded that neither Robinson nor Powell
prohibits the criminalization of “compelled behavior,” the panel
held that the interdiction scheme constituted a permissible exercise of Virginia’s police power.111 In the court’s view, the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause could not be applicable to
interdiction itself, because interdiction is a civil, rather than a
criminal, proceeding.112 And because the criminal sanctions that
apply to interdicted individuals target specific, well-defined acts,
104

See supra note 73.
Manning v. Caldwell (Manning I), 900 F.3d 139, 154 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en
banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019).
106
Id. at 151.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 151–52 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
109
Id. at 146 (“To the extent that post-Powell decisions have relied upon the
plurality opinion in Powell, they have overextended themselves in doing so.”).
110
Id. at 146–47.
111
Id. at 147–48.
112
Id. at 148.
105
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the panel found that those criminal sanctions also pass constitutional muster under the Eighth Amendment.113 Although Virginia’s interdiction scheme was unique in its precise contours, the
panel found it to be no different in kind from other civil-criminal
statutory schemes that “adopt a two-step approach” and “sanction
relatively minor acts in order to forestall more serious criminal
misconduct.”114 For example, courts routinely grant temporary
restraining orders in civil proceedings, and anyone who violates
such an order may be subject to criminal penalties.115
Judge Motz wrote separately to argue that Powell could—
and should—be read as repudiating the status-act distinction in
Robinson.116 She argued that the outcome in Robinson would have
been the same had the statute at issue in that case permitted the
state first to interdict the appellant and deem him a “prescription
drug addict[ ]” and then to subject him to criminal penalties for
attempting to fill a legally obtained prescription for narcotics.117
Because Virginia’s statutory scheme would be unconstitutional
under Robinson if it criminalized alcoholism “in one step,” and
the outcome in Robinson would have been the same had California criminalized narcotics addiction in two steps, Judge Motz
concluded that the interdiction scheme must be impermissible
under Robinson.118 Nevertheless, because Fisher “constitute[d]
circuit precedent” and compelled the panel’s judgment, Judge
Motz concurred “with reluctance and regret.”119
4.

Rehearing En Banc (Manning II)

After rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed itself,
held that Virginia’s interdiction statute was void for vagueness,
and overturned Fisher.120 Judge Motz and Judge Keenan, writing
for a majority of eight, based their opinion in large part on Judge
Motz’s concurrence in Manning I. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissent, in which five judges joined.
Although the plaintiffs argued before the district court that
the term “habitual drunkard” is unconstitutionally vague, they
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

banc).

Id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 156 (Motz, J., concurring).
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 160 & n.4.
Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir. 2019) (en
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“expressly declined” to argue the issue on appeal, either before
the panel or the en banc court.121 The majority in Manning II
nevertheless concluded that it had discretion to consider, sua
sponte, arguments not raised by the parties122 and “excus[ed]” the
plaintiffs’ “abandonment or forfeiture” of their vagueness claim.123
In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson characterized the plaintiffs’ “failure to press a claim” as a waiver rather than a forfeiture and
argued that the court had “no basis for reaching the vagueness
challenge.”124
As to the merits of the vagueness claim, the majority found
that Virginia’s statutory scheme failed to establish “any standard
of conduct by which persons [could] determine whether they [we]re
violating the statute” or even “minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement” in enforcing the statute.125 The court held the statutory scheme to be “unconstitutionally vague” even as applied to
the plaintiffs, who “admitted difficulty in maintaining sobriety.”126
The dissent found the vagueness claim unavailing.127 Judge
Wilkinson argued that the “sole purpose” of the interdiction process itself is to “provide notice” and “address the very concerns
that motivate vagueness doctrine in the first place.”128 Even if
that were not so, the dissent argued, “the term ‘habitual drunkard’ . . . is simply not vague under any conceivable standard.”129
With respect to the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, the
majority cited Powell for the proposition that, for homeless alcoholics who could neither resist drinking nor avoid public places,
a public intoxication statute “would be unconstitutional as applied to them.”130 Because the plaintiffs were “pathologically” driven to “pursue alcohol use,” had no “volitional control over their
drinking,” and could not avoid drinking in public, the majority
concluded that Virginia’s statutory scheme was unconstitutional

121

Id. at 271.
Id. (collecting cases).
123
Id. at 271–72, 271 n.6.
124
Id. at 300 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“We do not have here a simple failure to
press a claim. The appellants instead expressly waived any appeal on their vagueness challenge.”).
125
Id. at 274 (majority opinion).
126
Id. at 277–78.
127
Id. at 301 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 280–81 (majority opinion) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551
(1968)).
122
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as applied to the plaintiffs.131 The scheme “would, in effect, ‘ban[ ]
a single act for which [homeless alcoholics] may not be convicted
under the Eighth Amendment—the act of getting drunk.’ ”132
Just as the majority found support in Powell for its opinion,
so too did Judge Wilkinson in his dissent. He argued that “Powell
neither extended [n]or contracted Robinson, which was left undisturbed.”133 After a review of post-Powell cases, the dissent concluded that the majority opinion was “at odds with the Supreme
Court’s understanding of its own decision.”134 According to the
dissent, the majority’s opinion introduced a “nebulous ‘nonvolitional conduct’ defense,” which could “metastasize and absolve
individuals from personal responsibility for all forms and manners of criminal acts.”135
II. ANALYSIS
A.

The En Banc Court’s Void-for-Vagueness Rationale Is
Inapposite

1.

The Court Should Not Have Considered the Plaintiffs’
Waived Claims

Waiver and forfeiture are distinct under the law. “Whereas
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.’ ”136 In Manning II, the en banc court cited United
States v. Simms for the proposition that “waiver, in a technical
sense, concerns a party’s relinquishment of rights before a district court.”137 Simms in turn cited to United States v. Olano for
the proposition that, “where a party raises and then knowingly
withdraws a claim before the district court, there is no error for
[an appellate court] to review.”138 In other words, if the plaintiffs
had raised and dropped their vagueness claim in Hendrick, the

131

Id. at 281 (quoting Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 25).
Id. at 280–81 (alterations in original) (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 551).
133
Id. at 289 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 304.
136
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
137
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 271 n.6 (quoting United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d
229, 238 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 304 (2019) (mem.)).
138
Simms, 914 F.3d at 238 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 733).
132
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en banc court would have been compelled to deem it waived and
could not have considered it in Manning II.
Although that may be true, circuit courts also routinely
reject claims that parties have litigated at trial but have
neglected, omitted, or declined to raise at the outset of an appeal.139 For example, in United States v. Washington, a panel of
the Fourth Circuit held that an appellant had waived the claims
and defenses he had “failed to raise in his opening [appellate]
brief.”140 In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson posited that, prior to
this case, the Fourth Circuit had been “especially reluctant to
consider waived arguments”141
Judge Wilkinson argued further that the “open-endedness” of
the majority’s opinion may threaten “the neutrality of procedure”
that “protects litigants . . . against arbitrary courts and ambush
by adversaries.”142 Having “provided no standard under which an
en banc court can resolve a claim affirmatively waived before a
panel,” the majority’s decision to do so in this case may “significantly degrade[ ] the place of panel process in federal appellate
review.”143 More to the point, under the majority’s rule, no waiver
is ever final: “Future litigants will rely on this case endlessly to
excuse inexcusable carelessness, or worse, calculated litigation
strategy that in hindsight proved unsuccessful.”144
Judge Wilkinson’s arguments are not unpersuasive. The en
banc court placed a particular emphasis on the “exceptional importance” of the vagueness issue and expressed a willingness to

139
See, e.g., McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We think it
reasonable to hold appellate counsel to a standard that obliges a lawyer to include
his most cogent arguments in his opening brief, upon pain of otherwise finding them
waived.”); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well
settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”), aff’d, 487 Fed App’x 1 (3d Cir. 2012);
United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases)
(“We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and
arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where
those arguments raise constitutional issues).”), aff’d, 972 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished table decision).
140
United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 941 n.1 (4th Cir. 2014) (collecting
cases) (“[W]e do not countenance a litigant’s use of [Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure] 28(j) as a means to advance new arguments couched as supplemental
authorities.” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ashford, 718
F.3d 377, 381 (4th Cir. 2013))).
141
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 300 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 301.
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consider “alternative legal theor[ies]” that it “deemed necessary
to reach the correct result.”145 Reaching back to a Fourth Circuit
case decided in 1971 and a Supreme Court case decided thirty
years earlier, the majority asserted that the Courts of Appeal
may “sua sponte consider points not presented to the district
court and not even raised on appeal by any party.”146
It appears that the en banc court was willing to resurrect the
plaintiffs’ vagueness claim under nearly any circumstances.
That it chose to do so in a way that undermines the efficiency
and comity of the appellate process147 is all the more unfortunate,
given that the en banc court’s holding is likely incorrect on the
merits.
2.

The Term “Habitual Drunkard” Is Not Unconstitutionally
Vague

Vagueness doctrine exists to provide “fair notice” so that
“citizens [can] conform their conduct to the proscriptions of the
law.”148 Some imprecision is tolerable, but the more severe the
consequences of violating a statute, the more precise its terms
are expected to be.149 Given that “civil laws” may “impose penalties far more severe” than their criminal counterparts, vagueness
doctrine is not applicable solely to criminal statutes.150 Courts
have applied “ ‘relatively strict test[s]’ for vagueness” to civil laws
with “quasi-criminal” and “stigmatizing effect[s].”151
Nevertheless, even in cases where the Supreme Court has
applied “the most exacting vagueness standard”152 and “the most
rigorous scrutiny,” it has found that “open-ended” and “imprecise” terms are “perfectly constitutional.”153 In Jordan v. De

145
Id. at 271–72 (majority opinion) (first quoting United States v. Simms, 914
F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019); and then quoting Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1971)).
146
Id. at 271 (quoting Wash. Gas Light Co., 438 F.2d at 251) (citing Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
147
Id. at 300 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“[A] panel of three remains our basic
unit of decision, three being a more efficient and more collaborative number than a
conclave of fifteen.”).
148
Id. at 274 (majority opinion).
149
Id. at 272–73.
150
Id. at 272 (quoting Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
151
Id. at 273 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 499 (1982)).
152
Id. (quoting Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213).
153
Id. at 301–02 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1214).
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George, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the respondent’s
deportation order, although it was predicated on his conviction
for a “crime involving moral turpitude.”154 The Court held that
whatever shades of meaning the phrase might acquire “in
peripheral cases,” its meaning was sufficiently clear in the
respondent’s case.155 Similarly, just a few months before a panel
of the Fourth Circuit decided Manning I, the Supreme Court
noted in Sessions v. Dimaya that “[m]any perfectly constitutional
statutes use imprecise terms like ‘serious potential risk’ . . . or
‘substantial risk.’ ”156 The Dimaya Court ultimately held the
statute in question to be vague—but not because the Court had
any reason to “doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the
application of a qualitative standard . . . to real-world conduct.”157
Rather, the issue was that the statute, by its terms, required the
Court to estimate the risk of an “idealized ordinary case of [a]
crime,” not any particular criminal act that the respondent had
committed.158
Here, there is no such issue. As the Ninth Circuit noted in
Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, “the term ‘habitual drunkard’ readily lends itself to an objective factual inquiry.”159 Moreover, while
it is no doubt true that “habitual drunkard” is an archaic and
even a stigmatizing term, it is also true that many laws retain
the use of such terms without offending the Constitution. As
noted above, for example, the Supreme Court in Jordan found
that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” was not unconstitutionally vague.160
As Judge Wilkinson noted in his dissent, Virginia courts
have had no difficulty supplying definitions for the term “habitual drunkard.”161 In Jackson v. Commonwealth, for example,
the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the term applies to “one
who . . . is admittedly in the continual habit of being intoxicated
154

Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951).
Id. at 232 (“[T]he decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was
an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.”).
156
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1214.
157
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015)) (“[T]he
law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly . . .
some matter of degree.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913))).
158
Id. at 1213–14 (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561).
159
Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017).
160
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951).
161
Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d 264, 302 (4th Cir. 2019) (en
banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
155
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from alcohol.”162 Other courts have described with even more specificity the patterns of conduct that characterize a “habitual
drunkard”: “a repeated course of consuming alcohol to excess,
excess being the impairment of judgment, the loss of motor
function, the lessening of impulse control, and other commonly
recognized effects.”163
As the plaintiffs’ own pleadings show, they exhibited many of
these effects and frequently consumed alcohol to excess. Although
the term “habitual drunkard” may create some uncertainty as
applied in borderline cases, it clearly applied to the plaintiffs,
who admitted in their own pleadings that their alcoholism
rendered them “unable to maintain sobriety.”164 The Fourth Circuit should have found, as the district court found in Hendrick,165
that because the statute clearly applied to the plaintiffs, they
lacked standing to challenge the interdiction scheme on vagueness grounds.
B. The En Banc Court Overextended Itself in Relying on Powell
1.

Both the Majority and Dissent Relied on Powell

The correct interpretation of Powell hinges at least in part on
a separate pair of cases, Marks v. United States166 and Hughes v.
United States.167 In Marks, the Supreme Court held that, where
a case is decided by a plurality, “the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”168 Judge Wilkinson
and Judge Motz read Hughes very differently. The Court in
Hughes found either “that it was ‘unnecessary to consider’ its
holding in Marks,”169 as Judge Wilkinson would have it, or that it
was “ ‘unnecessary’ to reconsider the reasoning of the Marks
rule,”170 as Judge Motz put it.

162

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 122, 125 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 302 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
164
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 120–21.
165
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
166
430 U.S. 188 (1977).
167
138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).
168
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976) (plurality opinion)).
169
Manning v. Caldwell (Manning I), 900 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added), rev’d en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019).
170
Id. at 156 (Motz, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hughes on three
questions, two of which concerned the proper application of
Marks to the Court’s fragmented decision in Freeman v. United
States.171 The Court received “extensive briefing” and heard
“careful argument” on two questions related to Marks:
(1) “Whether [the Supreme] Court’s decision in Marks means
that the concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the
holding of the Court where neither the plurality’s reasoning nor
the concurrence’s reasoning is a logical subset of the other”; and
(2) “Whether, under Marks, the lower courts are bound by [a]
four-Justice plurality opinion . . . , or, instead, by [a] separate
concurring opinion with which all eight other Justices
disagreed.”172

Both of these questions went unanswered. The makeup of the
Court had changed between 2011, when a fractured Court
decided Freeman, and 2018, when the Court heard arguments in
Hughes.173 Lower courts had also had occasion to apply and
interpret the Court’s decision in Freeman, and in the process had
uncovered “systemic concerns” with its rationale.174 After careful
reconsideration of the underlying question presented in Freeman,
the Court in Hughes was able to resolve it on the merits with a
majority of six justices.175
Under these circumstances, it is not precisely correct to say
that the Court in Hughes found it either “unnecessary to consider” or “unnecessary to reconsider” Marks. Rather, as Justice
Kennedy wrote in his opinion for the majority in Hughes, the
Court found it “unnecessary to consider questions one and two”—
the questions pertaining to Marks.176 Even so, Hughes is not entirely a red herring. It may serve as a preview of things to come
if the Supreme Court has occasion to reconsider its decision in
Powell.
To be sure, Powell is ripe for reconsideration. The appellant
in that case, Leroy Powell, challenged his conviction for public
171

See Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1771–72; Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522

(2011).
172
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i,
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155)).
173
In Freeman, Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent. Freeman,
564 U.S. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In Hughes, Justice Gorsuch joined the
majority. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1770 (majority opinion).
174
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772.
175
Id.
176
Id. (emphasis added).
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intoxication on the ground that his “chronic alcoholism” compelled him to drink and “his appearance in public [while drunk
was] . . . not of his own volition.”177 Although Justice Marshall, in
his opinion for the plurality, relied on the best science available
at the time, he found no evidence that Leroy Powell’s alcohol
addiction had compelled his behavior, or even that Powell “could
in fact properly be diagnosed as [an] alcoholic” at all.178
At trial, Powell testified that he had had a single drink
before coming to court.179 On cross-examination, the prosecution
elicited testimony that Powell had “exercised [his] will power and
kept from drinking anything . . . except that one drink.”180 Powell
testified on redirect, however, that once he began drinking he
ordinarily had no “control over how many drinks [he could]
take.”181 The record does not disclose whether Powell routinely
suffered from withdrawal symptoms, or if he drank on the
morning of trial because he hoped to forestall such symptoms.182
Because Powell had been able, at least on the day of his trial,
to stop after a single drink, and because he had reported no withdrawal symptoms, Justice Marshall refused to conclude that
Powell suffered a “compulsion” to drink.183 To Justice Marshall
and the plurality, it seems to have been quite clear that Powell
drank of his own “free will,” and his conviction for public
intoxication was justified.184 In fact, the plurality leaned into the
notion that criminal sanctions may serve as a “powerful deterrent” against public drunkenness: “Criminal conviction represents the degrading public revelation of what Anglo-American
society has long condemned as a moral defect, and the existence
of criminal sanctions may serve to reinforce this cultural taboo.”185
Justice White, concurring in the plurality’s judgment, wrote
that, “[i]f it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion
to use narcotics,” then it could not “constitutionally be a crime to
yield to such a compulsion.”186 Nevertheless, he recognized that

177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (alterations in original).
Id. at 524.
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
See id. at 525.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 526, 535.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
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Powell had been convicted of “being drunk in a public place.”187
For a homeless alcoholic who lived on the public streets and had
“no place else to go and no place else to be [while] drinking,”
Justice White accepted that “a showing could be made that . . .
avoiding public places when intoxicated” would be “impossible.”188
“As applied” to such individuals, a public intoxication statute
would be “in effect a law which bans a single act for which they
may not be convicted under the Eighth Amendment—the act of
getting drunk.”189 Because the record did not show that Powell
lacked the capacity “to stay off the streets” while drinking,
however, Justice White concluded that Powell’s conviction did not
offend the Constitution.190
The dissenters in Powell saw addiction generally, and alcoholism specifically, as a disease, rather than as a moral failing.
They argued that Powell’s alcoholism rendered him unable to
“resist the ‘constant excessive consumption of alcohol.’ ”191 Because “he could not prevent himself from appearing in public
places” when he drank,192 the dissenters would have held that his
public intoxication was “symptomatic of [his] disease.”193 Under
these circumstances, the dissenters would have followed the
Court’s decision in Robinson and concluded that subjecting
Powell to criminal penalties for public intoxication constituted
“ ‘cruel and inhuman punishment’ within the prohibition of the
Eighth Amendment.”194 “[T]he principle that would deny power to
exact capital punishment for a petty crime would also deny
power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment for being
sick.”195
2.

Now More Than Ever, It Is Unclear Whether Powell Is Still
Good Law

As the Supreme Court itself has recognized, the Marks rule
is relatively simple to explain, but difficult to apply in practice.196
187

Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
Id. at 551.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 553–54.
191
Id. at 570 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
192
Id. at 568.
193
Id. at 569.
194
Id. at 569–70.
195
Id. at 569 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas,
J., concurring)).
196
See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994) (noting that the
rule “is more easily stated than applied”).
188
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Manning II is a quintessential example of the rule’s difficulty of
application. Judge Motz, writing for the majority, concluded that
Justice White’s concurrence constituted “the narrowest ground
supporting the Court’s judgment” in Powell.197 In his dissent,
Judge Wilkinson argued instead that neither the plurality in
Powell, nor Justice White’s concurrence, nor any other holding
has “overturn[ed] or in any way disrupt[ed] Robinson.”198
In similar cases, the Court has declined “to pursue the
Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so
obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it.”199 Instead, the Court has reexamined its fragmented
decisions and, where possible, has issued clear precedents. In
Nichols v. United States, for example, the Court reconsidered its
“splintered decision” in Baldasar v. Illinois200 rather than attempting to apply the Marks rule.201 Although the Court had
occasion in Grutter v. Bollinger to revisit its “fractured decision”
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,202 it again
found it unnecessary to apply Marks.203 Rather than rummaging
through the six opinions produced in Bakke and declaring under
Marks that the narrowest of them was binding, the Court instead
“endorse[d]” the reasoning of Justice Powell’s concurrence and
built upon it to forge a workable set of standards that commanded a five-justice majority.204 And as discussed above, the
Court in Hughes reconsidered the underlying issue in Freeman
rather than applying the Marks rule.205
Half a century ago, when Justice Marshall was writing for
the plurality in Powell, there were “tremendous gaps” in the
scientific understanding of addiction.206 At that time, E.M.
Jellinek was among “the outstanding authorities on the subject”
of alcoholism.207 Jellinek was in fact a pioneer in the area of

197
Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d 264, 280 & n.13 (4th Cir. 2019)
(en banc).
198
Id. at 290 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
199
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–46.
200
446 U.S. 222 (1980).
201
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–46.
202
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
203
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325, aff’d, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
204
Id.
205
See supra notes 171–176 and accompanying text.
206
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 524 (1968).
207
Id. at 522.
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addiction research and “helped orient the field at its inception.”208
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall found himself baffled by
Jellinek’s work: “In attempting to deal with the alcoholic’s desire
for drink in the absence of withdrawal symptoms, Jellinek is
reduced to unintelligible distinctions between a ‘compulsion’ . . .
and an ‘impulse.’ ”209 It does not seem to have occurred to Justice
Marshall that Leroy Powell drank wine at eight o’clock in the
morning not because he sought some hedonistic thrill or because
he was in thrall to some moral infirmity but rather because he
had to drink to avoid withdrawal symptoms.
It is unlikely that a modern court would be so unaware—or
so heedless—of the workings of addiction. Addiction is now commonly spoken of as a disease rather than as a moral failing. The
“disease model” of alcoholism “construes alcoholism as an incurable all-or-none unitary disorder caused solely by hereditary
physical abnormalities.”210 “According to [this] model, addiction
is a brain disease . . . characterized by changes in specific brain
systems, especially those that process rewards . . . .”211 The National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism has funded
biomedical research into “the neurotransmitter systems on which
alcohol acts.”212 Underlying this work is a “policy mantra . . . that
alcoholism is a ‘chronic brain disease.’ ”213
Although early addiction researchers, including Jellinek,
proposed the disease model at least in part to remove the moral
stigma of addiction,214 the stigma remains. Even recovering alcoholics, for whom the disease model is the very foundation of their
treatment efforts, often speak of addiction in terms of “moral
inventory,”215 “spiritual disease,”216 and “character defects.”217
208

Judit H. Ward et al., Re-Introducing Bunky at 125: E.M. Jellinek’s Life and
Contributions to Alcohol Studies, 77 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS 375, 375 (2016).
209
Powell, 392 U.S. at 525–26.
210
William R. Miller, Alcoholism: Toward a Better Disease Model, 7 PSYCH.
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 129, 133 (1993). From its earliest days, Alcoholics Anonymous
has espoused the disease model of addiction. See BILL W., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS:
THE BIG BOOK: THE ORIGINAL 1939 EDITION 65, 183, 282 (Ixia Press 2019) (1939).
211
MARC LEWIS, THE BIOLOGY OF DESIRE: WHY ADDICTION IS NOT A DISEASE 1
(2016).
212
Wayne Hall, Biomedicalization of Alcohol Studies: Ideological Shifts and Institutional Challenges, 102 ADDICTION 494, 494 (2007) (book review).
213
Id.
214
E.M. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 69 (1960).
215
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
264–65 (4th ed. 2001) (An alcoholic cannot “take the moral inventory and then file it
away; . . . the alcoholic has to continue to take inventory every day if he expects to
get well and stay well.”).
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A tone of moral disapprobation also suffuses both of Judge
Wilkinson’s Manning opinions. In Manning I, for example, he
compared the compulsive drinking of an alcoholic to a child
molester’s “uncontrollable pedophilic urges.”218 And in his dissent in Manning II, he argued that, because “irresponsible
alcohol consumption increases the likelihood of more grave
offenses,” Virginia’s lawmakers “surely had good reason to think
that the population of prior abusers posed a greater risk to the
community than others who lack such a history.”219 True, Judge
Wilkinson’s argument does not go quite so far as Justice Marshall’s opinion in Powell in suggesting that criminal penalties
and the concomitant moral stigma may “reinforce [a] cultural
taboo” forbidding alcoholism, just as they “reinforce other,
stronger feelings against murder, rape, theft, and other forms of
antisocial conduct.”220 But at bottom, Judge Wilkinson’s argument is the same as Justice Marshall’s: criminal penalties are
valid exercises of state police power because they may effect
general and specific deterrence and discourage addicts from
giving into their moral weaknesses and succumbing to their
addictions.
The Supreme Court justices who issued the fractured opinions in Powell, no less than the Fourth Circuit judges who heard
Manning I and II, approached their decisions with moral judgments and “strong feelings” about alcoholism and addiction. If
the current Court were to reconsider Powell, the outcome would
largely depend on whether at least five justices believe that, as
Judge Wilkinson put it, “consuming alcohol, even by those with a
documented history of alcohol abuse, is just not the sort of
conduct that warrants criminal sanctions.”221 It is unlikely that a
216
Id. at 64 (“From [resentment] stem all forms of spiritual disease, for we have
been not only mentally and physically ill, we have been spiritually sick. When the
spiritual malady is overcome, we straighten out mentally and physically.”).
217
Id. at 355 (“Dishonest thinking, prejudice, ego, antagonism . . . , vanity, and a
critical attitude are character defects that gradually creep in and become a part of
[the alcoholic’s] life. Living with fear and tension inevitably results in wanting to
ease that tension, which alcohol seems to do temporarily.”).
218
Manning v. Caldwell (Manning I), 900 F.3d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en
banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930
F.3d 264, 292–93 (4th Cir. 2019) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the principle espoused by the appellants and the majority” could allow “child molesters [to]
challenge their convictions on the basis that their criminal acts were the product of
uncontrollable pedophilic urges and therefore beyond the purview of criminal law”).
219
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 295 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
220
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968).
221
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 296 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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majority of the modern Court would agree with that proposition.
On the contrary, were the Court to take up, for example, a challenge to Utah’s interdiction scheme, a majority may well accept
that alcoholism is a disease even as it upholds the interdiction
scheme as constitutionally sound. For that reason, the en banc
court should not have “overextended” itself in basing its decision
on Justice White’s concurrence in Powell.
C. Constantineau Should Have Controlled the Outcome of
Manning
In Manning I, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims, noting that, in Paul
v. Davis, “the Supreme Court ha[d] been careful” to establish
that the “redress of reputational injuries” is the province of “state
law.”222 In Manning II, the en banc court declined to pass on the
plaintiffs’ due process claims.223 The majority may have been satisfied that the Eighth Amendment and the Vagueness Doctrine
provided all the relief that the plaintiffs required—or it may have
agreed with the finding of the panel that Paul precludes the “redress” of injuries to a litigant’s reputation.
In Paul, the Supreme Court clarified its earlier decision in
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,224 in which it held that cases “[w]here
a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him” could properly
be heard in the federal courts.225 At issue in Constantineau was a
Wisconsin statute that authorized “designated persons” to “cause[ ]
to be posted a notice” prohibiting “the sale or gift” of alcoholic
beverages to anyone whose “excessive drinking” threatened to
reduce her family to penury or jeopardized “the peace of any
community.”226 Although the Wisconsin statute required any
such “posting” to be in writing, and further that a “copy of [the]

222

Manning I, 900 F.3d at 152 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
Manning II, 930 F.3d at 272. In Judge Wilkinson’s dissent, however, a citation to Paul served as the centerpiece of a cri de cœur against what he perceived as
the majority’s judicial overreach: “[T]he states are the primary expositors of the common law. The risk of having our Constitution resemble more and more a common
law document, where meaningful restraints on judicial preferences are minimal, is
all too real.” Id. at 298 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701).
224
400 U.S. 433 (1971).
225
Paul, 424 U.S. at 708 (quoting Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437).
226
Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 434–35, 434 n.2. “[D]esignated persons” included
government actors such as town supervisors, aldermen, mayors, chiefs of police, and
district attorneys, among others. Id. at 434 & n.2.
223
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writing . . . be personally served upon the person” to whom it
pertained, the statute did not provide for either notice or a
hearing.227 The Court held that “posting” constituted “such a
stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural due process
require[d] notice and an opportunity to be heard.”228
The Court in Paul held that, even where a state’s tort law
protects an individual’s “interest in reputation,” governmental
action that inflicts some “harm or injury to that interest,” without more, is insufficient to support a claim that the government
has deprived the individual of “liberty” or “property.”229 In so
doing, however, the Court was careful to leave Constantineau intact. Constantineau rooted the right to relief under the Due
Process Clause not solely in the “defamatory character of the
posting” and the resulting “stigma” but also in “the governmental
action” that “deprived the individual of a right previously held
under state law—the right to purchase or obtain liquor in
common with the rest of the citizenry.”230
In essence, though not in nomenclature, the Wisconsin
statute at issue in Constantineau provided for the interdiction of
habitual drunkards. Although Constantineau thus appears to be
directly on point, it is all but absent from the pleadings and
opinions generated in this case.231 Had the Fourth Circuit founded its Manning II decision on Constantineau, it could have
reached the same outcome and provided the same relief to the
plaintiffs. But in doing so it would have relied on a case that,
unlike Powell, was decided by a six-justice majority and manifestly remains good law.
CONCLUSION
Virginia was nearly alone in maintaining a two-phase interdiction scheme that branded alcoholics “habitual drunkards” and
subjected them to criminal penalties for the possession of alcohol.
Such punitive solutions are manifestly cruel and generally
ineffective.232 In March 2020, after the Virginia General Assem227

Id. at 434–35, 434 n.2.
Id. at 436.
229
Paul, 424 U.S. at 712.
230
Id. at 708–09.
231
In the memorandum supporting their motion to dismiss Hendrick, the
defendants argued that Constantineau was distinguishable from the instant case.
See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 34.
232
One study suggests, for example, that when policing “focuses on a subset of
social incivilities, such as drunken people . . . and street vagrants, and seeks to
228
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bly approved a bill repealing the interdiction scheme as it applied
to “habitual drunkards,” both the bill’s sponsor and the governor
acknowledged how inapt the scheme had become.233 Delegate
Jennifer Carroll Foy characterized the interdiction of “habitual
drunkards” as “draconian” and “arbitrary.”234 Governor Ralph S.
Northam noted that the Commonwealth’s “archaic” law “criminalize[d] people for being homeless or suffering from addiction”
and “punished [them] without helping them.”235
To the extent that Manning II declared the interdiction
scheme unconstitutional and all but signed its death warrant,
there can be little doubt that the Fourth Circuit reached a correct
and sensible result. But in its apparent eagerness to redress an
injustice, the en banc court founded its opinion on Powell, a
precedent that, for all its longevity, may be vulnerable to
supersession or reversal. Had the court decided the case based
on the plaintiffs’ due process claims, its decision would stand on
firmer ground, and it would not have deepened an existing split
of authority among the circuit courts.236

remove them from the street via arrest,” it exacerbates distrust between police and
communities of color. Anthony A. Braga et al., Can Policing Disorder Reduce Crime?
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